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THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE
RULE OF DECISION
INTRODUCTION
The international community has become increasingly sensitive to
human rights violations.' Manifestations of this sensitivity dating
from the establishment of the United Nations' through President
Carter's human rights campaign 3 indicate a keen awareness of the
threat posed to all civilized nations by the "flagrant disregard of basic
human rights."' In the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1350,3 the Alien
Tort Statute, provides a jurisdictional mechanism through which
federal district courts may uphold international standards of conduct.
This statute permits district courts to adjudicate controversies
brought by an alien 6 for a tort that is committed in violation of inter-
1. See generally Nayar, Introduction: Human Rights: The United Nations and
United States Foreign Policy, 19 Harv. Int'l L.J. 813 (1978); Van Dijk, International
Law and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1529
(1978).
2. One of the stated purposes for the creation of the United Nations was "pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights." U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
3. President Carter stated that "[a]ll the signatories of the United Nations Char-
ter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no
member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its
own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to
speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world."
Address by President Carter, United Nations (Mar. 17, 1977), reprinted in 76 Dep't
State Bull. 329, 332 (1977).
4. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). Although the
criteria for determining international law has remained constant, see note 7 infra, the
willingness of courts to find violations under these criteria has increased. This reflects
a rise in the standard of conduct imposed by civilized nations. Kaufman, A Legal
Remedy for International Torture?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
6. An alien is defined generally as "a foreign born person who has not qualified
as a citizen of the country." Black's Law Dictionary 66 (5th ed. 1979). In Davis v.
District Director, Imm. & Nat. Serv., 481 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1979), however,
an American who expatriated himself by signing an oath of renunciation of citizenship
under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1976) was classified an alien. Thus, a more accurate
definition is any person who is not a United States citizen or national. Immigration
and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1976); 1 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 2.3d, at 2-22 (1980); see Manlangit v.
United States Dep't of Justice Imm. & Nat. Serv., 488 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1973);
Manguerra v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 390 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1968); D'Alessio v.
Lehmann, 289 F.2d 317 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 822 (1961); Mesina v.
Rosenberg, 278 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1960).
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national law,' even when neither party is a United States citizen and
the tort occurred in a foreign country.'
Although the statute has rarely been invoked," it has recently been
given fresh impetus by Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,0 in which the Second
Circuit held that tortious harm resulting from torture satisfied the
jurisdictional requirements."1 The Filartiga court, however, did not
reach the issue of what law would govern a suit properly taken by a
court under section 1350. -12 The issue is difficult to resolve partially
because numerous conflict of laws theories have been advanced for
determining the selection of an appropriate rule of decision.,' Fur-
thermore, in section 1350 cases, the traditional selection of the
7. International law, or the law of nations, has been defined by legal philos-
ophers as "[laws [that] have been established, which enjoined the Utility, not of
special communities, but of that great aggregate System of Communities," Grotius,
On the Rights of War and Peace, in The Great Legal Philosophers 80, 84 (C. Morris
ed. 1959) and "laws or rules ... which are imposed upon nations or sovereigns by
opinions current amongst nations." Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Deter-
mined, in The Great Legal Philosophers 335, 352 (C. Morris ed. 1959). The Second
Circuit has similarly defined international law as " 'a violation by one or more indi-
viduals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between
states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for
their common good and/or in dealings inter se.'" IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.
Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)); see United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
691 (1832); Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2-59 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Pan., 255 F. Supp. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally P. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1968).
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff and defendant
were from Paraguay and the alleged tortious act occurred in Paraguay); IIT v. Ven-
cap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff %as from Luxembourg, defendant
from the Bahamas, and the alleged tortious act took place in Luxembourg).
9. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) CThis old but little
used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first
Judiciary Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know [from] whence it
came."). The paucity of suits may be due to the statutory requirement that an allega-
tion of a violation of international lav be made at the jurisdictional threshold. Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Courts ... accordingly, en-
gaged in a more searching preliminary review of the merits than is required ...
under the more flexible 'arising under' formulation" appearing in other jurisdictional
statutes); see Comment, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien
Tort Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F.L. Rev. 105, 108 (1979) (hereinafter cited as A
Legal Lohengrin].
10. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Id. at 878. The court held "that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of hu-
man rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties." Id.
12. Id. at 889. The court noted that "[s]hould the district court decide ... to
apply Paraguayan law, our courts will not have occasion to consider what law would
govern a suit under the Alien Tort Statute where the challenged conduct is action-
able under the law of the forum and the law of nations, but not the law of the
jurisdiction in which the tort occurred." id.
13. See pt. II infra. Furthermore, "[t]he lawv on 'choice of law' in the various
states and in the federal courts is a veritable jungle, which, if the law can be found
1981]
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domestic law of an interested jurisdiction 11 may not reflect the inter-
national community's interest in deterring egregious conduct.'"
This Note contends that international law should usually be the
rule of decision selected in section 1350 cases. Part I will examine the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1350, which suggest that inter-
national law is a proper rule of decision in cases brought under the
statute. Part II will discuss the theoretical justification for selecting
international law as a rule of decision in section 1350 cases under
conflict of laws doctrines.
I. THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1350
The Alien Tort Statute, originally enacted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,16 provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."17 Only
two courts have taken jurisdiction under section 1350 18 both because
it is difficult to obtain personal jurisdiction over alien defendants 19
and because alleged tortious conduct rarely violates international
law."0 Moreover, because the phrase "committed in violation" is
out, leads not to a 'rule of action' but a reign of chaos dominated in each case by the
judge's 'informed guess' as to what some other state than the one in which he sits
would hold its law to be." In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732,
739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
14. Few conflicts of law theories provide a mechanism through which interna-
tional law may be selected as the rule that will resolve the dispute. See notes 55-66
infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 67-74 infra and accompanying text.
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) (emphasis added).
18. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); Abdul-Rahman
Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961). Two old cases also appear
to employ § 1350 as an alternative jurisdictional basis. Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas.
810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa.
1793) (No. 9,895).
19. To subject a defendant to full personal liability, he must be physically present
in the jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), or he must have
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). See generally M. Green, Basic Civil Proce-
dure, ch. 2, § 4, at 32 (2d ed. 1979).
20. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir.
1978) (airplane crash, even if accompanied by "willful negligence," does not violate
international law), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1975) (fraud is not a violation of international law); Abiodun v.
Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir.) (breach of contract through fraud
and deceit is not a violation of international law), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960)
(picketing to prevent the loading of a vessel not a violation of international law);
Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517, 519 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (neither conversion nor
[Vol. 49
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ambiguous,2' courts differ in their interpretations of the jurisdictional
requirement.' This phrase appears to allow either an action for a
domestic tort that has been committed through a breach of interna-
tional lawn3 or for an international tort-tortious conduct that is itself
an international law violation..24
The court in Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift " interpreted sec-
tion 1350 as granting a right of action for domestic tort suits when the
suit has some connection with an international law violation. A In
Abdul, a Lebanese citizen sued his ex-wife for wrongful interference
with child custody. -27  His ex-wife had deprived him of custody by
misrepresenting her child's identity on her passport and traveling
with the child from country to country to elude him.-- The court,
holding that passport fraud was a violation of international law and
wrongful interference with child custody was a tort, took jurisdiction.'
Various courts and commentators have viewed the action brought in
Abdul as one for a wrong under domestic law that rose to the level of
an international law violation because it was accomplished in a man-
ner that affected relations among nations.? Although the defendant
in Abdul did, indeed, falsify her passport, the court's adjudication of
breach of fiduciary duty constitutes a violation of international law); Valanga v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (no international law
violation was found for a refusal to pay life insurance proceeds); Lopes v. Reederci
Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (neither unseaworthiness
nor negligence constitutes a tortious international law violation).
21. A statute is ambiguous when "the words used may refer to several objects
and the manner of their use does not disclose the particular objects to which the
words refer." 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.02,
at 5 (rev. 3d ed. 1973).
22. Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) with Huynh Thi
Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978) and Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift,
195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
23. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
24. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Abiodun v. Martin Oil
Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 866 (1973); Lopes v.
Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
25. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
26. Id. at 865. The court noted that "[a]n alien, understandably though unjustifi-
ably, may prefer to bring an action for a tort in a federal court rather than in a local
court, and Congress has authorized him to do so in this limited class of cases." Id.
27. 195 F. Supp. at 862-63.
28. Id. at 864.
29. Id. at 865.
30. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1980). Valanga v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Lopes v. Reederei
Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1963); A Legal Lohengrin, supra
note 9, at 123; Note, The Law of Nations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
Over Tort Claims by Aliens Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 1 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 71,
80 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Law of Nations in the District Courts]; 4 Fordham
Int'l L.J. 213, 215 (1980).
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the alleged wrongfil interference with child custody did not address a
right arising under this violation of international law .3 Rather, the
court sought to remedy a wrong arising under domestic law-
deprivation of child custody.32 It took jurisdiction simply because the
tort was committed through a fortuitous breach of international law.,
Most courts that have considered exercising jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1350, however, appear to construe the statute as granting a right
of action for international tort violations. 34 In Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,- for example, Paraguayan citizens brought an action against a
Paraguayan state official for torturing a relative to death.- Finding
that torture committed under color of official authority was violative
of international law, 37 and that such torture caused tortious harm,-"
the court permitted the action under section 1350. 31
In seeking to remedy torture, the Filartiga court properly con-
strued the jurisdictional requirements of section 1350. Unlike Abdul,
in which the ancillary relationship between the tort and international
31. That the suit is essentially of a domestic character is seen not only in the
absence of analysis regarding passport violation damages, but also in the court's rec-
ognition and examination of traditional domestic policies, such as the interests of the
child involved. 195 F. Supp. at 866. Suits involving familial matters are considered
local disputes to be adjudicated by state courts. Thus, these matters are viewed as so
localized that even federal courts are excluded from the domestic relations area.
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858); H. Clark, Law of Domestic Rela-
tions in the United States § 11.2, at 286 (1968).
32. 195 F. Supp. at 863 ("Plaintiff does not seek money damages; he seeks a
judgment or decree for the return of his daughter to his custody.").
33. 195 F. Supp. at 863-65; see 4 Fordham Int'l L.J. 213, 215 (1980) (noting that
the suit in Abdul was for wrongful interference with child custody and that the inter-
national law violation was ancillary).
34. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 26 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d
1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.
1975); Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir.
1960); Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517, 519 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Valanga v, Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Damaskinos v. Socicta
Navigacion Interamericana S.A., Pan., 255 F. Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
35. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Id. at 878. It was alleged that Joelito Filartiga, the decedent, was tortured to
death by an inspector general of the Paraguayan police. Id. "He had been whipped,
slashed and tortured with electrical devices." Kaufman. supra note 4, at 44 (tracing
the development of torture from the rack and thumbscrew, through the "Spanish
boot," to modem inflictors of pain).
37. 630 F.2d at 878. Torture is universally recognized as a violation of interna-
tional law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe.
A/810, at 71 (1948); see G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N.
Doe. A/8028 (1971). Torture is defined in the United Nations Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) as "any act by which severe
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law enabled the court to remedy a domestic tort,," the tortious harm
alleged in Filartiga stemmed directly from the international law
violation. 41 Although there is no legislative history from which to
infer the intent of its drafters, 42 two factors support the conclusion
that the Founding Fathers intended to provide the federal district
courts with original jurisdiction only over such international torts.
First, it is most likely that the constitutional basis 3 upon which the
Founding Fathers relied was international law. Because the statute
permits suits between two alien parties," the suit cannot be premised
on diversity jurisdiction,' and, therefore, the subject matter must be
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the
instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or confessions, punishing him . . . or other persons." Id.
The Filartiga court's determination that torture committed under color of official
authority is a violation of international law regardless of the nationalities of the par-
ties, 630 F.2d at 884-85, nullifies the Second Circuit's statement in Dreyfus v. Von
Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976), that international law
violations do not occur when the aggrieved parties are citizens of the same state. Id.
at 31. Thus, the Filartiga court construed international law as conferring fundamental
rights on individuals vis-a-vis their own governments. 630 F.2d at 885.
38. 630 F.2d at 885. The court noted that the action sounded in tort by referring
to wrongful death actions. Id. The action for wrongful death is a creation of statute
and, therefore, did not exist at common law. Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz.
27, 29, 504 P.2d 928, 930 (1972); California State Auto. Ass'n v. Jacobson, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 850, 852, 101 Cal. Rptr. 366, 367 (1972); Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194,
197, 254 A.2d 525, 527 (1969). Wrongful death statutes generally permit actions for
wrongful or negligent acts that cause death. W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of
Torts § 127, at 903 (4th ed. 1971). Defendant's liability is premised on the same
theory as that for personal injury actions. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts
§ 24.3, at 1289 (1956).
39. 630 F.2d at 878.
40. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Md. 1961).
41. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); The Law of Nations
in the District Courts, supra note 30, at 76; 4 Fordham Int'l L.J. 213, 215 (1980).
43. Article III provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States .. . to Controversies
... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A federal court may only exercise that power pro-
vided by Congress as limited by Article III. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
512-13 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1962).
44. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1978)
(plaintiff was Dutch and defendants were British corporations); Damaskino v. Societa
Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Pan., 255 F. Supp. 919, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(plaintiff was Greek and defendants were Greek and Panamanian corporations).
45. Although federal jurisdiction may exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) over a
controversy arising under state law if the parties to the suit are a citizen of the state
and an alien, Butler v. Penix, 171 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
926 (1949), diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 does not exist when aliens appear as
both plaintiff and defendant. See Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 851 (1929); Johansson v. Nunez, 473 F. Supp. 1270, 1271
1981]
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a federal question to satisfy Article III of the Constitution.46 Interna-
tional law has traditionally been deemed a part of the "Laws of the
United States, '" 4' and, therefore, satisfies the requirements of Article
III. The only constitutional basis for the Abdul court's reading of sec-
tion 1350, on the other hand, is that wrongful interference with child
custody is a federal common law violation, rather than a violation of
state law. It is unlikely, however, that the Founding Fathers in-
tended the tort requirement to be construed in this manner because
a federal common law of United States torts was almost nonexistent
that early in the nation's history.4" Second, historical sources from
the period in which section 1350 was enacted indicate that the
Founding Fathers intended to provide a forum in which individuals
could vindicate rights arising under international law.49 For example,
James Madison stated in The Federalist that
(W.D. La. 1979); Trinanes v. Schulte, 311 F. Supp. 812, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kara-
katsanis v. Conquestador CIA. Nay., S.A., 247 F. Supp. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Cuozzo v. Italian Line, "Italia"-Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione-Genoa, 168 F,
Supp. 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
46. J. Moore, Federal Practice 0.84, at 735 (2d ed. 1980). Federal district court
jurisdiction falls into three general catagories: (1) federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), which is premised on questions arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States, and which requires a jurisdictional claim
in excess of $10,000 when the suit is not against the United States or an agency or
official thereof; (2) diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976),
which also requires a jurisdictional amount in excess of $10,000; and (3) special stat-
utes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), through which Congress has conferred juris-
diction without regard to jurisdictional amount. C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3561, 3601, 3568-3585 (1975).
47. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "It is an ancient and a salutary feature of the
Anglo-American legal tradition that the Law of Nations is a part of the law of the
land to be ascertained and administered, like any other, in the appropriate case."
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States (pt.
1), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 26 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Dickinson 1]. The Supreme
Court has stated that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as ques-
tions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); accord, United States v. Smith, 18 U.S,
(5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); see J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 86 (6th ed. 1963); Cavers,
Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131 Acad6mie de Droit Inter-
nationale 75 (1970). But see The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925)
("International practice is law only in so far as we adopt it, and like all common or
statute law it bends to the will of the Congress.").
48. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States (pt. 2), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 792, 816 (1953) ("[i]t is to be remembered that the
law of states was an immature law when the Constitution was adopted"); see Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92, 101 (10.01). The theory of federal
common law jurisdiction in the federal courts was not advanced until 1799, 10
years after the passage of § 1350. See Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35 Ill. L.
Rev. 519, 520 (1941).
49. Documents from the Federal Convention of 1787, including several state
plans, contain passages supporting a foreign individual's ability to utilize United
[Vol. 49
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the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned.... A distinc-
tion may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties
and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the
footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed
proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States.'
Similarly, John Jay noted the importance of ensuring that interna-
tional norms of conduct were observed."' Available evidence, therefore,
suggests that section 1350 should not be construed to permit aliens
entry into United States courts to litigate matters of essentially local
concern. Only allegations of international law violations sounding in
tort may properly be heard under the statute.
II. THE CHOICE OF LAW
The foregoing analysis resolves only the issue of whether a domes-
tic or an international tort must be alleged to satisfy the section 1350
jurisdictional requirements. When a court properly takes jurisdiction
over an international tort action pursuant to section 1350, it must
reach the entirely distinct issue of determining the appropriate rule
of law to be applied to the merits.' This involves a conflict of laws
analysism because the facts generally involve more than one state or
nation interested in the outcome of the litigation.5'
States courts. I The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 22 (M. Farrand
ed. 1937) (Virginia Plan); id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan); II id. at 157 (Document Vi1);
III id. at 626 (Hamilton Plan); see A Legal Lohengrin, supra note 9, at 103; The Law
of Nations in the District Courts, supra note 30, at 80.
50. The Federalist 532-33 (P. Ford ed. 1898); see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) ("one of the principal defects of the Confederation that
our Constitution was intended to remedy was the central government's inability to
"cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished.' " (quoting 1
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 19 (rev. ed. 1937) (notes of James
Madison))).
51. The Federalist 13 (P. Ford ed. 1898). John Jay stated that "[it is of high
importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations." Id.
52. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 124-26 (1904); McDaniel v.
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 455 F.2d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 1972); Seguros Tepeyac,
S.A., Compania Mexicana de Seguros Generales v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 174-77
(5th Cir. 1965); Transatlantic Cement, Inc. v. Lambert Freres Et Cie, 462 F. Supp.
363, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732,
744-47 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See generally Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts
and Directions for the Future, 16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1 (197T); Schmertz, The
Establishment of Foreign and International Law in American Courts: A Procedural
Overview, 18 Va. J. Int'l L. 697 (1978).
53. Conflict of laws is generally concerned "with the identification and systematic
handling of situations in which the persons concerned and the interests and policies
at stake have significant connections with more than one community." von Mehren,
Comment, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Signifi-
cance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 347, 349
(1974); see R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 2, at 3 (3d ed. 1977). See generally
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The numerous choice of law theories advanced have been founded
on the premise that the law chosen should be one that an interested
jurisdiction would apply in a fully domestic situation.- Under tradi-
tional analyses, a United States district court, as the forum, would
decide whether to apply its own law or the law of another interested
jurisdiction.' Employing the rule of lex loci delictil7 in a section 1350
case, for example, a court would choose the law of the jurisdiction in
which the international tort occurred. ' This rule, based on the con-
cept that rights are territorial in nature and vest in individuals at the
time the wrong occurs, 9 was once favored because it was simple to
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws § 5 (1971); H. Goodrich, Hand-
book of the Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 1964); J. Martin, Perspectives on Conflict of
Laws: Choice of Law (1980); J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (7th ed.
1872).
54. See notes 8, 44 supra.
55. von Mehren, supra note 53, at 347 ("The many and varied theories and prac-
tices regarding the selection of the governing law in situations significantly involving
more than one legal order traditionally have agreed on at least one proposition: the
law to be applied should be that.which one or more of the concerned legal orders
would apply in a fully domestic situation.").
56. See, e.g., Lauritizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 591 (1953); Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duke L.J. 171, 176-79; Lando, The Substantive Rules in the
Conflict of Laws: Comparative Comments from the Law of Contracts, 11 Tex. Int'l
L.J. 505, 512 (1976); McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus Reformu-
lated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the Context of Choice-of-Law
Problems Concerning Contributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 439, 444 n.25 (1979); Weintraub, The Future of Law for Torts: What Principles
Should be Preferred?, 41 Law & Contemp. Prob. 146. 147-48 (1977).
57. Lex Loci delicti literally means "the law of the place where the crime or
wrong took place." Black's Law Dictionary 1056 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Professor Beale
most strongly supported the place of the wrong rule. See O'Toole, The Place of
Wrong Rule: "An Unrepealed Remnant of a Bygone Age, A Drag on the Coattails of
Civilization?," 13 New Eng. L. Rev. 613, 618 (1978). Professor Beale's theory varied
from the comity theory presented by earlier theorists in the conflict of laws area,
particularly from that of Joseph Story. See J. Story, supra note 53, §§ 18, 20, 23. For
a discussion of Story's work, see Note, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 15 (1934).
58. See Jiminez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1978);
Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976, 979 (3d Cir. 1972); Doss v. Apache
Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1970); Murray v. City of Milford, 380
F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1967); Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1137 n.18 (M.D.
Fla. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980); Roman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441
F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1977); 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 38,
§ 30.4, at 1690-91; R. Leflar, supra note 53, § 132, at 264-67; Robb, The Tort Rule of
Private International Law-The Chimera Incarnate?, 8 Sydney L. Rev. 146, 149-51
(1977); 12 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1012, 1013-14 (1978).
59. A. Ehrenzweig, Private International Law 54-55 (3d ed. 1974). The basis of
the rule was that the cause of action is created in the state in which the tort oc-
curred. Thus, "a state 'can' exercise 'legislative jurisdiction' 'with respect to all persons
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apply and yielded predictable results. 6° It became unpopular during
this century largely because, in certain cases, it led to the selection of
laws of a jurisdiction that had no real interest in the suit.6 ' A variety
of more flexible approaches have risen to take its place," the two
most widely accepted of which are the "interest analysis" and "signifi-
cant contacts" theories. Under the "interest analysis" approach, a
court would select the law of the state with the strongest interest in
seeing its law applied. Similarly, under the "significant contacts"
approach, the strength of the connection between the cause of action
and the concerned jurisdictions would be analyzed to determine
and things subject to its jurisdiction' i.e., persons present or domiciled, things lo-
cated, and acts done or other events occurring, within the territory of the state. Any
interests 'created' by virtue of the 'power' based on such 'legislative jurisdictions' are
entitled to recognition everywhere." Id. at 55 (footnote omitted). This rule became
known as the "vested rights" doctrine. Cheatham, Some Developments in Conflict of
Laws, 17 Vand. L. Rev. 193, 197-98 (1963); Oroole, supra note 57, at 617. It was
codified in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934), that w%-as, in large part,
drafted by Professor Beale. See R. Leflar, supra note 53, § 1, at 1.
60. Cheatham, supra note 59, at 197-98.
61. The major virtues of the rule-certainty and ease of application-led to
rigid, mechanical applications that were widely criticized. See, e.g., Cheatham, upro
note 59, at 197-98; O'Toole, supra note 57, at 614-16; Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657, 669-73 (1959). In Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), the court stated that "the
vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited because it fails to take account
of underlying policy considerations in evaluating the significance to be ascribed to
the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabili-
ties which arise out of that act." Id. at 478, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746
(footnote omitted); accord, Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 177 (1st Cir.
1974) (abandoned lex loci delicti in favor of interest-weighing approach); McClure v.
United States Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) (abandoned lex loci delicti
in favor of the significant relationships doctrine); Roman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441
F. Supp. 1160, 1166-67 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (recent cases abandoned lex loci delicti in
favor of significant contacts). In the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971),
the rule was replaced by the "significant contacts" approach. Id. § 145.
62. Generally, the various conflict of laws doctrines extend along a spectrum be-
ginning with those that are rule-oriented and ending with those that are approach-
oriented. Reese, supra note 52, at 168 n.1; Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus
Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 Tenn. L. Rev.
975, 975-76 (1977); see, e.g., H. Goodrich, supra note 53, § 6 ("local law" theory); .
Leflar, supra note 53, § 105, at 243 ("choice-influencing considerations" approach);
Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 Harv.
L. Rev. 361, 367-69 (1945) ("comity" theory); Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 Okla. L. Rev. 340, 344, 350
(1965) ("proper law in a proper forum" theory); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or
Approach, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 315, 315-16 & n.1 (1972) ("significant contacts"
approach). See generally Lando, supra note 56.
63. This approach to solving conflict of laws problems was formulated in a series
of works by Brainerd Currie. B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws
(1963); Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress,
1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 754 (1963). The basic tenet of Currie's approach is that resolution of choice of
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which jurisdiction's law should apply. 64 These approaches are gener-
ally more flexible than the lex loci delicti rule because they permit a
court to apply the domestic law of an interested jurisdiction even
when it is not the law of the jurisdiction in which the act took
place." As under the lex loci delicti rule, however, the selection of
laws deemed available will be limited to those of specific jurisdictions
and, therefore, the law chosen will be wholly domestic.'
law problems should involve reviewing the policies underlying each of the different
laws involved and, consequently, the interest of each state in having its law applied
to the particular issue involved. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1234-35 (1963); Currie, supra note 56, at 178; see Lando, supra
note 56, at 508-09; McDougal, supra note 56, at 441-43; Sedler, The Governmental
Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 181, 181-84 (1977). This doctrine is sometimes referred to as "governmental-
interest" analysis. McDougal, Choice of Law: Prologue to a Viable Interest-Analysis
Theory, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1977); Sedler, supra. Although instrumental In
displacing the rigid lex loci rule, the doctrine has been criticized as authorizing an
"ad hoc" approach to solving conflicts problems. 9 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 641, 649
(1976); see Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Profes-
sor Currie, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 463, 484 (1960); Reese, supra note 62, at 316-19;
Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 548, 557-61 (1971);
Rheinstein, Book Review, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 632, 632-68 (1962). The landmark
decision using this approach is Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). In Babcock, residents of New York drove to Ontario, Can-
ada where they were involved in an accident in which one of the passengers was
seriously injured. The injured passenger brought suit against the driver's executrix.
Id. at 476-77, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 7,5. The issue was whether the
guest statute of Ontario or New York should apply. The court held that New York's
law should apply because of its interest in the suit. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85,
240 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52.
64. The "significant contacts" approach was adopted in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws (1971). Section 145 provides that "(1) [t]he rights and liabilities of
the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the
state which . . . has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties .... (2) Contacts to'be taken into account . . . to determine the law appli-
cable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, national-
ity, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." These contacts are
to be evaluated according to the particular issue involved. See In re Paris Air Crash
of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 740 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 634, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (1965); Currie, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1243 (1963); 12 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1012, 1015-16
(1978). See generally J. Martin, supra note 53, ch. 2. It has been suggested that tile
interest analysis approach and the significant contacts approach are barely distin-
guishable. See 9 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 641, 645 n.32 (1976); 23 Vand. L. Rev. 420,
422 (1970).
65. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
66. International law could theoretically be applied under these theories because
it is a part of the legal system of all civilized nations. See note 47 supra. It Is un-
likely, however, that a state would apply international law as a rule of a decision in a
wholly domestic case. Thus, international law is considered under these approaches
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The application of traditional conflict of laws theories to section
1350 international tort cases is undesireable because the interests of
the international community will rarely be taken into consideration.'
Had the Abdul court been correct in its construction of section 1350,
allowing district courts jurisdiction over local torts,63 the application of
traditional conflicts theories might sufficiently account for the in-
terests of the jurisdictions involved. Section 1350, however, was
enacted to protect the international community by upholding interna-
tional values.69 The policy interest of the international community
may, therefore, be inadequately reflected in the domestic laws of an
interested jurisdiction. For example, if a French diplomat were taken
hostage in Angola and later sued his captors under section 1350,
alleging that such tortious conduct violated international law, :- the
outcome of the suit would affect both domestic and international
policy interests. The policies promoted by domestic laws permitting
actions for false imprisonment and battery are, respectively, the pro-
tection of freedom from restraint of movement-' and freedom from
intentional and unpermitted contact with one's person. - In contrast,
the interest of the international community is in safeguarding an in-
ternational diplomatic system based upon trust and open communi-
only to the extent that international policy influences the selection of the domestic
law of an interested jurisdiction. For example, of nine policy factors listed in
Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 962-81
(1952), the most important is the needs of the interstate and international systems.
Id. at 981. Similarly, Leflar includes the maintenance of international and interstate
order as one of his five choice-influencing considerations. R. Leflar, supra note 53,
§ 96, at 195.
67. See notes 55-66 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 25-33 supra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
70. Such a seizure would be in violation of international law. United States Dip-
lomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, United States v. Iran, I.C.J. (Order of Dec.
15, 1979) (the International Court of Justice unanimously ruled that the hostages
taken by the Iranians in Tehran must be freed under principles of international law);
Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that the law
of nations requires governments to take reasonable precautions to prevent intimida-
tion, coercion, or harassment of diplomatic or consular representations of foreign
governments), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939).
71. "To confine one intentionally, without lawful privilege and against his consent
within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short, constitutes the tort of
false imprisonment." 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 38. § 3.7. at 226 (footnnte
omitted); accord, Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 35, 36 (rev. ed. 1966); W.
Prosser, supra note 38, § 11, at 42-43; see, e.g., Weisman v. LeLandais, 532 F.2d 308,
311 (2d Cir. 1976); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 865 (1976); Rawls v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Inc., 491
F.2d 141, 146-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974); Blitz v. Boog, 328
F.2d 596, 598-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964).
72. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (rev. ed. 1966); accord, 1 F. Harper & F.
James, supra note 38, § 3.3, at 215-20; W. Prosser, supra note 38, § 9. at 34-37.
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cation.7 Because these policy interests differ, applying domestic law
would not adequately promote the important policy interests re-
flected in section 1350 international tort suits."'
Although international law, as a rule of decision, has had no clear
role in the doctrine of conflict of laws,75 in section 1350 cases it pro-
vides a necessary alternative to traditionally selected domestic rules
of decision. Professors von Mehren and Trautman, proffering a strong
challenge to the proposition that domestic law must always be applied
to resolve disputes in which more than one jurisdiction has an
interest,6 provide a framework for the potential application of inter-
national law.7 The novelty of their approach is its abandonment of
the doctrines through which the law of a specific jurisdiction is always
selected." They suggest that when the policy interests of the multi-
state system are not adequately reflected by the laws of a single
jurisdiction,'79 it is necessary for a court to fashion a law. This "super-
law," which need not be the domestic law of any concerned
73. Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (the inviola-
bility of diplomatic representatives protects friendly international intercourse), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939). The International Court of Justice has outlined relevant
international policy interests in these situations declaring that "there is no more fun-
damental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the inviolabil-
ity of diplomatic envoys and embassies." United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran, United States v. Iran, I.C.J., at 16 (Order of Dec. 15, 1979).
74. See A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems 77
(1965) (when a true conflict exists, the policies underlying the laws of one interested
jurisdiction must be promoted at the expense of those of another jurisdiction).
75. R. Leflar, supra note 53, § 6, at 9; Mann, State Contracts and State Respon-
sibility, in International Law in the Twentieth Century 566, 570-75 (L. Gross ed.
1969); Yates, Foreign Law Before Domestic Tribunals, 18 Va. J. Int'l L. 725, 726-27
(1978). See generally Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 706 (1963); Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Con-
flict of Laws in the United States, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1599 (1966).
76. Professors von Mehren and Trautman believe that territorially based analyses
of conflict of laws are based upon two faulty premises: first, that interests are ex-
pressed by physical location exclusively, and second, that the intensity of the physi-
cal connection indicates the degree of interest. A. von Mehren & D. Trautman,
supra note 74, at 63.
77. Id.; Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal
Common Law, 41 Law & Contemp. Prob. 105 (1977); von Mehren, supra note 53.
78. This approach has roots in the writings of Professor Jitta, who stated that
whenever "'a juridical relation may not belong to the active local life of a society but
to the active, international . . . life'", the law applied may be " 'an independent
provision which is derived from a consideration of the local public order and the
universal public order.* " Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts In the Conflict
of Laws, 30 Yale L.J. 655, 668 (1921) (translating D. Jitta, La Substance Des Obliga-
tions Dans Le Droit International Priv6 23 (1906)).
79. Two examples of such situations are marriage validation statutes and the rule
for proxy marriages. A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, supra note 74, at 229-30. This
is because the application of domestic law could lead to the dissolution in state X of a
marriage that was valid in state Y. Id.
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jurisdiction,' represents a "normal substantive ... rule . . . , one
widely shared in the legal world to which the concerned jurisdictions
(including the forum) belong."81 In essence, the multistate commu-
nity is treated as a separate and interested jurisdiction whose policies
may differ from other jurisdictions interested in the resolution of the
suit. Furthermore, although the von Mehren-Trautman theory weighs
the interests of all concerned jurisdictions, its presumption is that the
interest of the multistate system mandates the application of this su-
perlaw as the rule of decision.-
Although this consensus-oriented approach is directed primarily at
interstate conflicts, u it is well-suited to actions brought pursuant to
section 1350 because the resolution of these actions affects the inter-
national order as well as individual interested nations. The problem
in applying this theory, however, is that it is often difficult to fashion
a "normal or usual rule" of international law.4 In multistate conflict
cases, it may be possible to formulate a normal rule because states
are united in their concern for promoting certain fundamental values,
such as a republican form of government. In the international com-
munity, on the other hand, it is far more difficult to identify a com-
mon denominator of policy interests because different nations espouse
radically different values.' The difficulty lies in finding the consen-
sus of opinion in the international community that defines interna-
tional law. Although this problem may deter courts from adopting a
80. Substantive rules for multistate problems are appropriate when the law of a
single jurisdiction would be inadequate. Applying the rule, therefore, reflects the
recognition that, on occasion, applying a law designed for fully domestic situations to
a multistate situation creates serious problems. von Mehren, supra note 53, at 356-
57. This approach requires the consideration in multistate situations of both domestic
and multistate policy interests. A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, supra note 74, at 76.
In recent years, this approach has become more prominent in Europe. von Mehren,
supra note 53, at 348. Professor Cavers had rejected this approach because he be-
lieved that it left the court without guidelines and because it could lead to even
greater confusion in the field of conflicts of law. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-
Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173, 193 n.35 (1933).
81. Trautman, supra note 77, at 105.
82. A court using this theory would consider "whether the policies of particular
concerned jurisdictions with views departing from [the superlaw] are strong enough
and relevant enough to justify application of their divergent views in the particular
case." Id.
83. Id. at 106.
84. Id. at 130.
85. Compare U.S.S.R. Const. arts. 50-52 (severe limitations on freedoms of
speech, press, and association) with U.S. Const. amend. I (safeguards these freedoms
without restriction).
86. Courts must engage in an arduous process for such a determination.
Schmertz, supra note 52, at 717-22; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-84(2d Cir. 1980); HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). This pro-
tracted study is necessary because courts should apply international law only when
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consensus-oriented approach in cases brought under statutes other
than section 1350,11 it is not an obstacle to fashioning an international
rule of decision in section 1350 cases because a court may only take
jurisdiction over a case if an international law violation is alleged at
the outset of the trial." Thus, a determination whether there is suffi-
cient agreement in the international community to fashion an interna-
tional law will have been made at the jurisdictional threshhold, and
the elements of an international law violation will be at the court's
disposal.89
Concededly, the decision to apply international law in a specific
case brought under section 1350 should reflect the possibility that the
interest of a concerned jurisdiction is strong enough to override the
interest of the international system to which the jurisdiction belongs.
In most cases, however, international law should be chosen as the
rule of decision because section 1350 cases present issues of vital in-
terest to the international community. The practical effect of this
choice is, in some cases, to impose liability on a defendant when the
domestic law of the country that would be chosen under traditional
the community of nations supports the rule. R. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in
the International Legal Order 10 (Lillich ed. 1964). International law is determined
by consulting judicial decisions, custom and usage of nations, and the writings of
jurists. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); accord, liT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1005 (2d Cir. 1975); Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp.
517, 519-20 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp.
292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The guidelines used for determining international law in
United States courts are very similar to those employed by the International Court of
Justice. The statute of the I.C.J. provides that "[t]he Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law." Stat. I.C.J. art. 35.
87. International law must be determined at the trial level if the jurisdictional
statute does not require its determination earlier. Thus, from the standpoint of
administrability, it may not be practicable to employ international law as a rule of
decision in cases brought under many jurisdictional statutes. See R. Leflar, supra
note 53, § 105, at 208-10; A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, supra note 74, at 263,
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). Other statutes that similarly involve a determination
of international law at the outset include 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) (setting punish-
ment for those who, on the high seas, commit "the crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations") and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976) (granting the Supreme Court
original and exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ll actions or proceedings against ambassa-
dors or other public ministers of foreign states or their domestics or domestic ser-
vants, not inconsistent with the law of nations").
89. The statute creates an identity of substance and procedure in that the court
makes a de facto judgment of the merits at the jurisdictional stage. A Legal Lohn-
grin, supra note 9, at 110.
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territorial based theories would not find him liable.' Nevertheless,
it is not unfair to hold individuals to international standards of con-
duct. Because conduct that is determined to be in violation of inter-
national law is universally condemned,9' individuals should reasonably
expect to be held accountable for egregious conduct that violates the
normY2 Thus, from the viewpoint of policy considerations, as well as
practicality, international law is an appropriate rule of decision in sec-
tion 1350 cases. Moreover, this conclusion is supported by the stat-
ute's inference that international law is the proper rule for redressing
international law violations."
CONCLUSION
The potential application of international law as the rule of decision
in section 1350 cases places a great responsibility upon United States
courts. The effectiveness of section 1350 is based upon the respect
afforded international law. If international law is to remain a re-
spected reflection of the consensus of nations, courts must be careful
to find violations of international law only when a clear consensus
exists. Thus, the Alien Tort Statute should be used sparingly to make
United States courts the protectors not of rights in a chaotic and un-
just world but rather of firmly established international standards of
conduct.
Richard A. Conn, Jr.
90. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the possi-
bility of liability under international law when local law would not impose liability).
91. Id. at 881; see note 86 supra.
92. The Law of Nations in the District Courts, supra note 30, at 82-88. It is
axiomatic that the law of nations applies to individuals as well as to states. Dickinson
I, supra note 47, at 26, 35. "[Ilt had been expounded as a univeral law binding upon
all mankind". Id. at 27. See generally Dumbould, Hugo Grotius: The Father of In-
ternational Law, 1 J. of Pub. L. 117 (1952).
93. See notes 42-51 supra and accompanying text.
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